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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioner appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post 
conviction relief asserting that the court erred when it applied the revised version 
of I.AR. 14, rather than the version in effect at the time of his criminal case, in 
determining when the statute of limitations ran on his post conviction claims. 
Briefly, in the criminal case, the defendant pied guilty, was sentenced to a 
rider, went on his rider, was flopped, then filed and prosecuted a direct appeal 
(including a petition for review which was denied), all prior to July 1, 2011. 
Petitioner filed a timely petition for post conviction relief. However, the 
district court, apparently failing to realize that I.AR. 14 (time for filing appeals) 
had been amended effective July 1, 2011, summarily dismissed all his claims 
relating to his conviction (as opposed to his sentence) as being time barred 
because he failed to appeal them within 42 days of the judgment. The court also 
made alternative rulings dismissing these claims. 
Since the court applied the wrong law, it clearly erred. But to make matters 
worse, his appointed post conviction counsel also failed to argue that the current 
version of I.AR. 14 could not have required an appeal of the conviction to be 
taken some two years prior to the amendment which would allow such an appeal. 
Instead, appointed counsel conceded that the majority of the claims were time 
barred and because of this did not argue their merits, but instead simply made an 
absurd equitable tolling argument. 
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Thus, Appellant asserts that the summary dismissal must be reversed 
because the district court was clearly wrong about the timeliness issue. Further, 
since Appellant received ineffective assistance of post conviction counsel who 
failed to correct the court and then failed to address the merits of the claims, this 
matter should be reversed and remanded so that competent counsel can 
address the claims and prosecute the post conviction petition. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The background of this matter is explained by the district court in its notice 
of intent to dismiss petition for post conviction relief. 
The Judgment of Conviction establishes that Atwell was sentenced 
to the Idaho State Penitentiary for the crime of Conspiracy to 
commit Injury to Children for a unified sentence of 10 years, 10 
determinate, 0 years indeterminate, on July 20, 2009 with the Court 
retaining jurisdiction for a period of one hundred eighty days. Atwell 
did not appeal from that judgment. A review hearing was held on 
January 4, 2010. The Court relinquished jurisdiction on January 12, 
2010 and reduced Atwell's sentence to a unified sentence of 10 
years, 7 determinate, 3 years indeterminate. Atwell filed an appeal 
of the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction on January 15, 2010. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on November 16, 2010. 
Atwell filed a Petition for Review that was denied on December 9, 
2010. Atwell then filed this Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on 
December 1, 2011. 
In his petition, Atwell asserts that his "conviction should be 
overturned" or that his "sentence and plea agreement should be 
exchanged for a plea of misdemeanor battery" or that his sentence 
be amended to a sentence of 6 years with probation. 
Id., p. 2. (R. p. 49.) 
To further explain, Petitioner filed a verified pro se petition for post 
conviction raising some seven claims related to his conviction and four claims 
2 
related to his sentence or other post sentencing matters. (R. p. 4-25.) Petitioner 
also requested that counsel be appointed (and counsel was). (R. p. 26-29, 36.) 
The state moved for summary dismissal and filed a memorandum in 
support, arguing that the majority of the claims are barred by the statute of 
limitations. (R. p. 45.) According to the state, this was because no appeal was 
filed at the time of the conviction, but only after jurisdiction was relinquished. 
Thus, since more than a year and 42 days had passed since the conviction, the 
claims related to the conviction are time barred. (R. p. 45-46.) 
The court then issued a notice of intent to dismiss which followed the 
state's theory of untimeliness, but also made alternative rulings regarding the 
claims. (R. p. 51-61.) 
Appointed counsel filed a memorandum in opposition to motion for 
summary disposition which conceded that the majority of the claims are time 
barred and so did not discuss the actual factual allegations, but instead 
requested that the state of limitations be equitably tolled. (R. p. 121-122.) 
The court rejected all of appointed counsel's arguments and requests and 
entered its judgment dismissing the petition. (R. p. 128-130.) 
Appointed counsel then filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. 
(R. p. 135-136, 137.) 
Petitioner timely appeals from both the judgment dismissing the petition 
and from the motion to reconsider. (R. p. 139-140.) 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied the post conviction 
relief petition as untimely and whether a remand is necessary because Petitioner 
received ineffective assistance of post conviction counsel. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY DENIED THE POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF PETITION AS UNTIMELY AND A REMAND IS 
NECESSARY BECAUSE PETITIONER RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF POST CONVICTION COUNSEL 
A. Standard of Review 
"Our review of the district court's construction and application of the time 
limitations aspects of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is a matter of 
free review." Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188 (Ct.App. 2009). 
Also, the standard of review for a motion for reconsideration is as 
explained in Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65 (2007): 
A decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration generally 
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Abuse of discretion is 
determined by a three part test which asks whether the district court 
"(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted 
within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; 
and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason." 
Id. p. 71 (internal citations omitted). 
8. The Arguments and the Court's Rulings 
As mentioned above, Petitioner filed a verified pro se petition for post 
conviction relief raising some seven claims related to his conviction and four 
claims related to his sentence or other post conviction matters. (R. p. 4-25.) The 
state moved for summary dismissal and filed a memorandum in support, arguing 
that the majority of his claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (R. p. 45.) 
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The state argued that a petition for post conviction relief must be filed 
within 1 year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination 
of the appeal and that an appeal of a conviction must be filed within 42 days of 
the judgment according to I.AR. 14(a). (R. p. 45-46.) The state explained that in 
this case the judgment of conviction was entered on July 21, 2009, and so 
defendant had 42 days to appeal it but he did not. Thus, he was required to file 
his petition for post conviction relief on issues regarding his conviction by 
September 1, 2010. Since his petition was filed on December 1, 2011, it is 
untimely as to challenges to his conviction and must be dismissed as to those 
issues. (R. p. 46.) 
The state then explained that only claims related to the denial of 
probation following his retained jurisdiction are timely, but those are barred by 
res judicata. (R. p. 46.) 
The court issue a notice of intent to dismiss which followed the state's 
theory of timeliness: 
Additionally, the statute of limitation for post-conviction actions 
provides that a petition for post-conviction relief "may be filed at 
any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for 
appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the 
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is 
later." LC. § 19-4902. 
Atwell utilized several appeal options available to him. The latest 
decision on a proceeding following the appeal was a dismissal of a 
petition for review by the Court of Appeals on December 9, 2010. 
Since this petition was filed on December 1, 2011, within the one 
year deadline, the petition is timely. However, as will be discussed, 
portions of his claim that predate his conviction are clearly barred 
by the statute of limitations. 
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ANALYSIS AND DECISION 
Atwell raises the following issues in his petition for post-conviction 
relief: 
1. Undisclosed charges; 
2. Illegal search and seizure; 
3. Vindictive prosecution; 
4. Duress; 
5. Judicial bias; 
6. Ineffective assistance of counsel: Failure to investigate, Guilty 
Plea, and Sentencing; 
7. Ineffective appellate counsel; 
8. Disproportionate sentence; 
9. Illegal sentencing enhancement based upon prior convictions; 
10. Illegally imposed sentence; and 
11. Arbitrary denial of probation. 
Portions of Atwell's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
Atwell did not appeal from the original judgment of conviction. 
Therefore, the time for filing a petition for post-conviction relief 
relating to any issues arising from the conviction itself expired as of 
August 2010 (one year and 42 days from the judgment in July 
2009). Those aspects of his claims which fall into this category will 
be discussed below. 
Id., p. 4-5. (R. p. 51-52.) 
The court's rulings were somewhat unclear, but basically it went on to find 
that claims 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 were untimely. But the court's same reasoning, to 
wit, if the claims concerned the conviction and not the sentence they are time 
barred, would logically apply to claims 4 and 6 as well (as appointed counsel 
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assumed, more on this below). Also, the court did make alternative rulings 
and dismissed every claim on grounds other than timeliness. 
Appointed counsel filed a memorandum in opposition to motion for 
summary disposition (rather than a response to the court's notice of intent to 
dismiss). The memorandum states since the court's finding that the petition was 
untimely as to any issues arising from the conviction itself would effectively 
prevent Petitioner from arguing the majority of his factual allegations, to wit, 
issues 1-6, the statute of limitations will be the primary focus of the brief. (R. p. 
121-122.) Appointed counsel did not argue the merits of claim 6 (and 
presumably 4) because he thought that the court had found it to be time barred. 
(R. p. 124.) 
Regarding the timeliness issue, appointed counsel requested only that the 
court invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling to the extent that said relief is 
available to him. (R. p. 122.) Appointed counsel also (correctly) argued that the 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was a timely claim (even 
under the court's theory of timeliness) since it concerned counsel's performance 
after the judgment of conviction was issued. (R. p. 123.) Appointed counsel also 
believed the court found that issue 8 was time barred even though it had not. 
(R. p. 123.) 
As to the claims that even the court found timely, appointed counsel made 
some nonsensical arguments which will not even be attempted to be explained 
here. (R. p. 123-125.) 
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The memorandum concluded by reiterating that the primary subject of 
the memorandum is the statute of limitations and requested 7 days in which to 
supplement the record with an affidavit. "It is Atwell's position that he did not 
know/was not informed of the deadlines in which to file an appeal concerning his 
Judgment of Conviction and was also not made aware of the deadlines relating 
to the filing of a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief." (R. p. 125.) 
The court then filed a judgment dismissing post conviction relief, which 
explained: 
Atwell concedes that his petition relating to any claims arising from 
the conviction are time barred. Nevertheless he asks the court to 
consider the doctrine of equitable tolling. He presents absolutely no 
pleading, argument or evidence to support this position. The Court 
did advise Atwell that his petition would be dismissed as to any 
claims barred by the statute of limitations. The Court did not advise 
him that his petition would be dismissed for failure to support his 
untimely filing based upon an equitable tolling argument. The Court 
was not required to do so since Atwell has failed to amend his 
pleading or to offer any evidence in support of this argument. His 
"equitable tolling" assertion is without merit. 
Judgment p. 1-2. (R. p. 128-129.) 
Significantly, the judgment also explained: 
His second argument is that the State seeks summary disposition 
on res judicata grounds. The Court has addressed these issues in 
its notice of intent to dismiss which is specific and broader than the 
State's motion .... 
Judgment, p. 2. (R. p. 129.) 
As to the request to supplement the petition, the court stated: 
Next he asks for 7 days to file an affidavit to supplement the record. 
The Court has given Atwell more than adequate time to do this and 
declines to grant this request. If it is Atwell's position that he was 
not informed of the deadlines in which to file an appeal concerning 
his judgment of conviction, an affidavit in support thereof is of no 
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avail. That is an issue that should have been raised in a petition 
that was required to be filed within one year and 42 days from the 
conviction. This claim would be time barred even if he made such 
affirmation. 
Judgment, p. 2-3. (R. p. 129-130.) 
The court went on to reject all of appointed counsel's arguments and 
requests. (R. p. 130.) The court then dismissed the petition. (R. p. 130.) 
The next day, an affidavit of Petitioner was filed which inter alia, swore 
that he was never advised of any deadlines. (R. p. 132-133.) More importantly, 
attached to it was the version of I.AR. 14 in effect in 2009. (R. p. 134.) 
Appointed counsel then filed a bare motion for reconsideration which was 
based on an affidavit of facts of Petitioner. (R. p. 135-1636.) However, 
appointed counsel never pointed out in its motion that the relevant part of the 
rule at the time of the criminal case provided that: 
. . . In a criminal case, the time to file an appeal is enlarged by the 
length of time the district court actually retains jurisdiction pursuant 
to Idaho Code. When the court releases its retained jurisdiction or 
places the defendant on probation, the time within which to appeal 
shall commence to run. 
I.A.R. 14. (R. p. 134.) 
The court denied the motion for reconsideration without explanation. (R. 
p. 137.) 
C. The Court Erred in Summarily Denying the Petition as Untimely 
The district court was unquestionably wrong in its timeliness analysis 
since it used the wrong version of I.AR. 14. The version in effect at the time of 
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the entire criminal case and direct appeal is as recited above. However, that rule 
was amended, effective July 1, 2011, to provide as follows: 
. . . If, at the time of judgment, the district court retains jurisdiction 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-2601(4), the length of time to file an 
appeal from the sentence contained in the criminal judgment shall 
be enlarged by the length of time between entry of the judgment of 
conviction and entry of the order relinquishing jurisdiction or placing 
the defendant on probation; provided, however, that all other 
appeals challenging the judgment must be brought within 42 days 
of that judgment. 
I.AR. 14. 
In other words, the court in this case utilized the current version of the rule 
which requires the actual conviction to be appealed within 42 days of its entry but 
allows the sentence to be appealed within 42 days from the time the court 
relinquishes jurisdiction. But of course, that was not the rule during the criminal 
case, which instead provided that the time to appeal from the conviction and 
sentence did not commence until 42 days after the court relinquished jurisdiction. 
It appears that no one below, be it the prosecutor, appointed counsel, or 
the court, was aware of this amendment and just assumed that the current 
version was the version in effect at the time of the conviction. There was certainly 
no suggestion by anyone, nor could there be, that a rule that would not be 
promulgated for another two years could require Mr. Atwell to file a notice of 
appeal prior to the time that the time for appeal commenced to run. Nor can 
there be a suggestion that his failure to follow the then non-existent rule would 
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prevent his ability to challenge anything related to his conviction in his post 
conviction .1 
In short, the court was wrong about what version of the rule applied and 
so erroneous dismissed the claims in the petition for the reason that they were 
untimely. Further, the court erred when it denied the motion for reconsideration, 
because even if it was previously unaware of the amendment to I.AR. 14, by that 
time the correct version of the rule was before the court. 
D. A remand is necessary because Petitioner received ineffective assistance of 
counsel in an initial review proceeding 
The real question here is not whether the district court erred in its 
timeliness analysis, that is undisputable. Rather, the real question is what to do 
about it. As explained above, the court made alternative rulings as to the claims 
it was dismissing which were never challenged by post conviction counsel 
because he wrongly conceded they were time barred. Thus, Appellant asserts 
that simply affirming the summary dismissal based on the unchallenged 
alternative grounds is not the proper or equitable result here, but rather, this 
matter should simply be remanded back to the district court to start again with 
1 Since it is not at issue here, Appellant takes no position as to whether the court 
was correct regarding the operation of the current version of the rule which 
under the court's theory, would require not only two appeals, but two post 




While admittedly not directly applicable here, Appellant urges this result 
based in part on the sea change in law regarding the competence of post 
conviction counsel arising from the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2012), which concerned 
the federal habeas petition of a state prisoner. A bit of background is in order. 
According to the federal statutes and pursuant to various cases of the 
United States Supreme Court, before a claim may be brought in federal court, 
it must be exhausted in state court, to wit, the highest court of a state must have 
had an opportunity to rule on it. In the event a claim is unexhausted, there is a 
procedural default that bars federal rev[ew unless the pet[tioner can show 'cause' 
for the default and 'prejudice' therefrom. While attorney inadvertence rising to 
the level of an independent constitutional violation does constitute cause, the 
ineffective assistance of post conviction counsel did not since there is no 
constitutional right to counsel in state PCR proceedings. 
Then last term, the United States Supreme Court decided Martinez. Since 
this is not meant to be a comprehensive primer on federal habeas law, the 
following is a succinct explanation of Martinez as it appears in the Ninth Circuit 
case of Dickens v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2012): 
However, in Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court found "it . 
necessary to modify the unqualified statement in Coleman 
[Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. 
2 Appellant asserts the same is true as to the non-time barred claims since 
appointed counsel made only half hearted nonsensical arguments because as 
was stated in his memorandum, his focus was on the statute of limitations issue 
which he thought was controlling. 
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Ed. 2d 640 (1991 )] that an attorney's ignorance or inadvertence in 
a postconviction proceeding does not qualify as cause to excuse a 
procedural default." Martinez creates a narrow exception to 
Coleman: "Inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review 
collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's 
procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial." 
"Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a 
procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing 
a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-
review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in 
that proceeding was ineffective." The Supreme Court expressly 
held this to be a narrow equitable ruling and not a constitutional 
ruling. For a prisoner to meet this equitable rule establishing cause 
for a procedural default in a scenario applicable to this case, the 
prisoner must demonstrate that "counsel in the initial-review 
collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been raised, 
was ineffective under the standards of Strickland . ... " In addition, 
"[t]o overcome the default, a prisoner must also demonstrate that 
the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a 
substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate 
that the claim has some merit. 
Id. p. 1071-1072 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
In other words, Martinez held that where a petition for post conviction relief 
is the first time in which a defendant may raise a claim of ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel, the ineffective assistance of his post conviction counsel may 
constitute cause to excuse his procedural default in not raising a claim and thus 
allow the federal court to consider it. 
So again, while Appellant is not claiming that Martinez directly applies 
here, it does highlight the importance of competent post conviction counsel 
where certain claims concerning matters outside the record may only be raised 
for the first time in a post conviction. In our case, post conviction counsel clearly 
did not know the applicable law. Because he did not know the applicable law, he 
was unable to correct the court as to the applicable law. 
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But more to the point here, since post conviction counsel believed that the 
statute of limitations issue was controlling, he did not address the merits of the 
claims or provide any additional support for them and so gave the court no 
reason not to summarily dismiss them for the alternative reasons. Further, as 
post conviction counsel stated, the focus of his memorandum was the statute of 
limitations issue, and accordingly, his attempts to address the non-time barred 
claims were brief and nonsensical. 
Given all this, Appellant asserts that tile proper equitable remedy is to 
reverse and remand to the district court. At that time, newly appointed counsel 
can actually address the court's notice of intent to dismiss without being 
distracted by the timeliness red herring thrown up by the state and unfortunately, 
accepted by the court. 3 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, for the reasons as stated above, Appellant/Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the district court's summary denial of the post 
conviction petition be reversed and that this matter be remanded back to the 
3 Appellant recognizes that a successive petition for post conviction relief may 
possibly be appropriate as well. There, petitioner would assert as sufficient 
cause for a successive petition, that post conviction counsel's ineffective 
assistance of counsel caused the claims to be wrongfully dismissed on timeliness 
grounds and also prevented counsel from arguing or providing support for any 
other grounds and so counsel essentially abandoned the claims. However, this 
would end up requiring yet another proceeding and so judicial economy 
suggests that a remand is the more efficient method of proceeding. 
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district court for appoint~t_:3f a new attorney. 
DATED this~ day of November, 2012. 
/ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that orfthi;~ day of November, 2012, I served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS BRIEF, by the method as 
indicated below: 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATEHOUSE, ROOM 210 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0010 
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